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REPUBLICANISM AND MINIMAL ENTITLEMENTS:
OF SAFETY VALYES AND THE SAFETY NET
Akhil Reed Amar*
The title of today' s panel discussion is "The Takings Clause, the Con-
tracts Clause and Other Economic Rights Provisions of the Constitution." I
would like to focus on the word "other" and talk about some provisions of
the Constitution that are not typically thought of as economic provisions.
Professor Eule set out a nice account of the procedural requisites of a
democracy that abides by the rule of law: procedural requisites captured un-
der notions of prospectivity, generality, and nondiscrimination. The prospec-
tivity requirement can be seen in the contracts clause and the ex post facto
clause; the generality requirement can be seen in the takings clause; the non-
discrimination principle is found in the privileges and immunities clause and
the dormant commerce clause, if such a beast exists.
I would like to go beyond the procedural requisites of a working
democracy and talk about the substantive social and economic requirements
of a healthy democracy. In two words, I would like to talk about education
and property. My thesis, simply put, is that it is very difficult for a democ-
racy to operate properly if it lacks a middle class, or at least a lower middle
class. It is very difficult for a democracy to function if the citizenry is
illiterate and without any economic independence.
This is, I think, a widely held view among modem historians, sociolo-
gists, and political scientists. Consider Barrington Moore of Harvard and his
research on the social and economic origins of dictatorship and democracy,
or engage in a casual inspection of current world events. What we are seeing
today in Africa, in the Philippines, in Latin America, even in India, is the real
difficulty of trying to establish true democratic traditions when the underlying
social and economic structures of our society do not exist.
We do not need to look only to sociology or to current world events.
We can look to a tradition deep in American constitutional law that reflects the
same insight. It is a tradition that I refer to as the republican tradition, republi-
can with both a small and a capital r, because it was the vision of Abraham
Lincoln's Republican Party in the 1860s (and before it, the Free Soil Party),
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of Thomas Jefferson and the Democratic Republicans, and ultimately of a re-
publican commonwealth tradition in England associated most prominently
with James Harrington.
What is this republican tradition? The republican tradition is basically
one in which there is a recognition that in order for one truly to be a citizen in
a democracy and to participate in its democratic process, one needs a mini-
mum amount of independence. Economic independence is necessary if the
citizen is to be able to deliberate on the common good, the res publica, the
thing public. Hence, the word "republicanism." According to this tradition,
the problem of poor people is that, in a real way, they have no wills of their
own. You may give them the right to vote perhaps, but they will alienate that
right. They will sell it to rich people or to foreign tyrants. They lack some
minimal stake in society sufficient to connect their own personal interests
with that of the larger public interest. This is one of the reasons that Thomas
Jefferson was so concerned about cities and so hostile towards them. He saw
cities as breeding grounds for a kind of urban proletariat that had no real
stake in the common venture.
I have been talking about property thus far. We can also consider mili-
tary service as a substitute; an alternative way of demonstrating that one has a
commitment to and stake in society. The participation of many people in the
revolutionary war led to a feeling that they should not be disenfranchised,
disentitled to participate in public deliberations, just because they did not meet
the property requirements of the time. This led to various land reform move-
ments, including the abolition of primogeniture and entail. Lincoln's ultimate
decision to propose a thirteenth amendment to emancipate blacks was in large
part triggered by the fact that blacks had served as soldiers. Look, in fact, at
section three of the fourteenth amendment. The definition of the presumptive
voting body of the states is identical to that of the militia - males over
twenty-one. Or consider the tweJ).ty-sixth amendment adopted in 1971 ex-
tending the franchise to eighteen year olds who were at the time bleeding and
dying for this country.
In short, there is the republican vision that Thomas Jefferson had of the
yeoman farmer standing on his own land, pitchfork in one hand, able to pro-
vide for himself and his family, with a musket in his other hand, capable of
serving the militia and defending his country. There is in this vision a strong
hostility to the notion of a standing army, a mercenary army. The standing
army is dependent; it is paid by the government. The same kinds of intuitions
that many people today have about bureaucracy, welfare, and dependency on
government, I think, were held by the framers and illustrated by their concern
about standing armies and mercenary armies.
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I suggest that there are two basic ways of dealing with the republican
notion that in order for a democracy to work people must have a stake in so-
ciety. The first is the underside, the dark side of the republican vision. It is
the exclusionary side. It is the Athenian solution, and I would suggest it is
the original American solution. That solution is to enslave people, to ruth-
lessly disenfranchise people who do not have property, and to adopt poll
taxes and property qualifications.
Indeed human slavery led to a host of "economic rights" provisions in
the original Constitution. We see it over and over again. We see it in the two
clauses about non-importation of slaves. We see it in the fugitive slave
clause. We see it in the three-fifths rule. And it is lurking in the background
of several other clauses in the Constitution. This is dramatic evidence that
"economic rights" are not per se a good thing. We need to ask questions
about their distribution: Who has economic rights and to how much?
Edmund Morgan in his brilliant book called American Slavery,
American Freedom l elaborated on the seeming paradox of the fact that you
have radical language about liberty, equality, and the rights of man coexisting
in the same society that enforces a regime of human slavery. But in an odd
way it is not a paradox at all because it is the enslavement of many people that
provides the economic well-being of the rest, who constitute the polity.
Ironically, slavery provides a rough equality among whites - they are all
equal in being free men - and enough economic rent to allocate to poor
whites to make them economically independent.
But this original republican solution was radically modified by the Civil
War and the thirteenth amendment. There is a new solution to the problem. It
is no longer the Athenian solution of enslavement. It is an inclusionary solu-
tion. It is a solution that says that we will not allow a degraded caste of peo-
ple to exist in our society. It is a solution that provides inalienable property
rights of people in their own persons. Moreover, I suggest that it is a vision
that provides for, especially under section two of the thirteenth amendment,
forty acres and a mule. It is a vision that provides for a right to sustenance
and shelter - minimum sustenance, minimum shelter.
I submit that standard legal discourse has deradicalized this thirteenth
amendment vision, the inclusionary vision. The people who adopted the thir-
teenth amendment provided rights against the world. A Martian looking at
our Constitution would probably see the thirteenth amendment as its most
radical provision. There is no state action requirement, unlike just about ev-
ery other provision in the Constitution. We fought a civil war over this. It
radically changed the social and economic structure of society. The people
I. E. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom (1975).
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who adopted it did not know that the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments
were going to follow. They thought the thirteenth amendment was quite
broad.
I suggest that when the reconstruction amendments are viewed as a
whole, a radically different vision of society emerges. Precisely because the
fifteenth amendment gave former slaves the right to vote, and the fourteenth
amendment made them citizens by dint of their birth, you have to make sure
that they will have a certain minimum stake in society with the thirteenth
amendment. Otherwise you could not trust them to be voters under the fif-
teenth amendment.
Thaddeus Stevens, for example, had a policy of subsidized public edu-
cation, of land redistribution in the South - forty acres and a mule - and of
homesteading in the West.2 You can see connections now between the edu-
cational vision of Brown v. Board of Education3 and Thaddeus Stevens in
the Reconstruction. What does this suggest about the principles of prospec-
tivity and generality that I began with?
One thing is that some of these new economic rights provisions are
slightly redistributive. Abolishing primogeniture and entail changed the clus-
ter of existing Lockean property rights. Land reform in the South was redis-
tributive. Public education in some ways may be redistributive as well.
Wealthy people pay more school taxes than poor people, but poor children
are no less entitled to public education. In the West, we did not auction off
lands to the highest bidder. There was a distributional vision behind the
homesteading provisions of giving subsidized land to folks as long as they
were going to farm their own homestead.
What happens when there is no longer any land left?4 I suggest that
there is a connection between the "safety valve" of Western land one hundred
years ago and language about the "safety net" today, about trying to create
situations in which everyone has a minimum stake in society. It is very inter-
esting that soon after the closing of the West in 1890, Americans adopted the
sixteenth amendment which provides not simply for an income tax, but a
predictively progressive - that is, a redistributive - income tax.
Professor Epstein made a nice set of arguments about how the original
understanding and the structure of the Constitution was anti-redistributive.
His argument as I understand it is not so much textual as structural, looking
at the ideological background of the framers of the Constitution. But if you
are going to do that for the original Constitution - engage in that level of
2. This is similar to what is going on in Central America today with thoughts about land
redistribution in order to provide the social basis for a democracy.
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. The availability of such land was explicitly assumed by Locke's famous proviso.
HeinOnline -- 11 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev. 51 1988-1989
1988] REPUBLICANISM AND MINIMAL ENTITLEMENTS 51
generality in constitutional interpretation - to be consistent, to be a princi-
pled interpretivist, you have to be willing to do the same thing when looking
at the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments or the sixteenth
amendment, and recognize that they were motivated by a slightly different vi-
sion of economics and democracy.
I will end with two caveats and then try to come full circle. First, a no-
tion of minimal entitlements is not a notion that everyone should have an
equal amount of property. It is more a thirteenth amendment vision rather
than a fourteenth amendment vision. Second, this vision is not a socialist
one. It celebrates the notion of private property, but suggests that we have to
extend the benefits of that to all citizens in society, or at least extend the bene-
fits of some minimum property entitlement. This is the vision of Charles
Reich in his classic article on the new property.s It might suggest implica-
tions for the Rodriguez6 case dealing with a minimum right to education, or
for voucher systems in employment or education, not necessarily a kind of
socialist system in which people have property rights in other's income.
So we started with three principles - prospectivity, generality, and
nondiscrimination. My claim is that each one of these has to be importantly
qualified or modified. Prospectivity has to be complemented by a vision of
the substantive baseline. Prospectivity simply says whatever existing prop-
erty rights you have, must be resp~cted prospectively, but we need a theory
about initial baseline entitlements, starting points. We need a theory about the
birthrights of inheritance of every American citizen. That is what the thir-
teenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments are all about - birthrights of
every American citizen.
The proposition about generality must be supplemented by a vision of
the independence of citizens. The way to create that independence is to give
every citizen some minimum stake in society.
Finally, the notion of nondiscrimination, which is often assimilated to
non-redistribution, has to be qualified by the need to accommodate modest
redistribution so that we can make real today the vision of forty acres and a
mule for every American.
5. Reich, The New Property. 73 Yale LJ. 733 (1964).
6. San Antonio Independent School Dis!. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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